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Introduction 
This report by the European Commission has been drawn up pursuant to the commitment 
entered  into  at  the  Council  meeting  (Agriculture)  of 19  to  22  June  1995,  when  the 
Commission undertook to draw up a report each year analysing the consequences for the 
common agricultural policy and the single market of monetary fluctuations and the agri-
monctary  system in  force,  accompanied  by  proposals for  appropriate  remedies to  the 
problems that might ensue. 
It  also  constitutes  a  response  to  the  own-mrtmtlve  resolutions  of  Parliament  of 
19  Scprember  1995  on the agri-monctary system, 
1 which "calls on the Commission to 
make a detailed assessment of all implications of the Council Dc.cision
2 and its financial 
impact." 
This report relates to the economic sector of agriculture over the period 1 July  I995 to 
30 June I99G (1995/96). It comprises a main report summarizing and commenting on the 
result  of the  investigations  carried  out,  and  indicates  the  proposed  solutions  to  the 
problems identified. The main report is followed by a description of the analysis of agri-
monetary .events in  I995/96, and their effects. 
The first and second parts of the analysis, parts A and B, describe the currency and agri-
monctary  developments  of  the  period  under  review,  including  the  granting  of 
compensatory aid. As an earlier report was produced in a similar manner for the period 
I  January  1993 to  30 June I994,
3  developments in  the  latter half of I994 and the first 
half of I995  arc  referred  to,  so  as  to give  an  uninterrupted  picture of agri-monctary 
developments since the single market was completed on I January 1993. 
Part C is  an approach to the economic consequences at the level of agricultural markets 
and farm incomes. In view of the available statistics, the most convenient approach is to 
compare results for twelve-month periods from July to June for the analysis of prices, by 
calendar year for trade and by notional year for incomes. 
2 
3 
Joint resolution under Article 40(5) of Parliament's Rules of Procedure, No PE  193.731, of 19 
September 1995 on the agri-monetary system. 
Decision of  Council meeting of 19 to 22 June 1995, on the basis of  which two Council Regulations 
were adopted, namely Regulation (EC) No 1527/95 of29 June 1995 regulating compensation for 
reductions in the agricultural conversion rates of  certain national currencies (OJ L 148, 30.6.1995, 
p.  I) and  Regulation (EC) No 2611/95 of25 October 1995 establishing the possibility ofnational 
aid  being  granted  in  compensation  for  losses  of agricultural  income  caused  by  monetary 
movements in  other Member States (OJ L 268,  I 0.11.1995, p.3). 
COM(94)49S final. 
3 Part D assesses the effects of the agri-monetary system on Community expenditure. The 
impact is estimated on the basis of the  1996 budget in  the course of execution, and the 
'preliminary draft budget for_1997 as it stood at 30 June 1996. Budget years cover twelve-
month ·periods running from  16  October. 
The  basic  data  for  this  report  arc  presented  m  tables  and  graphs  appeanng  m  a 
Commission staff working paper. 
4 I.  MAIN REPORT 
A.  Agri-monetary effects ohserved 
1.  Conversion rates 
Although there were no major currency fluctuations in the period July 1995 to June 1996 
(referred to as 1995/96), at least half the Community currencies did behave in remarkably 
atypical  ways:  traditionaily  strong currencies  were  devalued,  and  currencies  that  had 
undergone numerous depreciations were revalued. 
Since the switch-over mechanism was discontinued on  I February 1995, all agricultural 
conversion rates  (ACRs) move up  and  down  in  line  with  representative  market rates 
(RMRs). However,  the  mechanism  for  aligning  ACRs on  RMRs is  not  symmetrical. 
Larger monetary gaps, and longer reference periods for their observation, arc needed to 
trigger a reduction in  the  ACR after a currency has appreciated
4  (i.e.  after a decline in 
institutinnal prices in national currency) than to trigger an increase in the ACR following 
depreciation. 
In  general, monetary gaps remained positive for  all  the currencies over the period.  As 
there  was  always  at  least  one  currency  (either  the  LIT  or  the  SKR) with  a  positive 
monetary gap in excess of 4 points, the permitted margin ("franchise") for negative gaps 
was very small, at less than one point, throughout the period.
5 This situation led to many 
minor devaluations - often very small indeed, with 82% of the adjustments amounting to 
less than .0.5%. 
Shortly after the Council's agri-monctary decisions of  June 1995, "appreciable" reductions 
were made to the ACRs of five currcncics.
6 The "appreciable" part of the reduction was 
0.496% for  the DKR, and ranged from  2.193% to  2.572%  for  the  I3LF,  DM, OS  and 
HFL. 
The other currencies that revalued were the PTA, the LIT and the SKR. The monetary 
gap  for  the  PTA stabilized after a  non~apprcciablc revaluation of 2.9%  in July  1995. 
There were four non-appreciable reductions in the ACR for the LIT in  1995/96, making 
a total decline of 12.1 %. There were three reductions in that for the SKR, totalling 9.9%, 
4 
5 
6 
Under the  agri-monetary arrangements, the  conversion  rates  express  the  value  of one  ecu  in 
national currency. A devaluation against the ecu therefore corresponds to an increase in those rates, 
while a revaluation is  equivalent to a reduction. 
Where the  "aggregate" gap made up of t.hc  largest positive  gap  and the  largest negative  gap 
exceeds 5 points over a certain number of  reference periods, ACRs must be adjusted to reduce the 
monetary gaps. 
An  "appreciable" reduction in the ACR is  one leading to  a reduction  in  institutional  prices in 
national currency that is greater than the effects of any devaluation occurring during the three 
preceding years. These effects arc estimated as two thirds of  the increase in institutional prices due 
to changes in  the ACR occurring between  12  and 24 months previously, and one third of the 
increase between 24 and 36 months previously. 
5 including one "appreciable" reduction of 1.734%.  A further appreciable reduction was 
made just after the end of the period, on 7 July  1996. 
Only two currencies were  significantly devalued:  the  ACR for  the  ORA increased by 
3.1 %, that for the FMK by  3.5%. 
2.  Ad hoc Council measures for apnreciable revaluations 
In view of the risk of an appreciable revaluation for the BLF, J?KR, OM, HFL and OS, 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1527/95 was adopted at the end of June 1995, to lay down 
ad  hoc  measures.  When  the  FMK and  SKR were  seen  to  be  at  risk  at  the  end  of 
December 1995, Council Regulation (EC) No 2990/95
7  provided for similar measures, 
later extended to 31  December 1996. 
These measures suspend the application of Articles 7 and  8 of the  basic agri-monetary 
Regulation;
8 they introduce flat-rate compensatory payments and a freeze on agricultural 
conversion rates. Article 7 provides, in  cases of revaluation exceeding the devaluations 
of the two preceding years, for an increase in ecus in most direct aid to producers
9 so as 
to avoid any decline in its value in national currency. In view of the scale of the aid in 
terms of  the budget (almost 60% ofEAGGF Guarantee Section expenditure), this measure 
would cost approximately ECU 250 million a year for each percentage point revaluation. 
Article 8 of Regulation (EEC) No 3813/92 provides for aid to offset the loss of income 
occasioned by the impact on prices of reductions in ACRs. The aid may be granted only 
after  a  twelve-month  reference  period,  on  the  basis  of the  actual  reduction  in  farm 
mcomes .. 
3.  Freezing ·of ACRs 
ACRs for  the  aid  referred  to  in  Article  7 of the  basic agri-monetary  Regulation  arc 
frozen at the rate in force on 23  June 1995, or 11  January 1996 in the case of the SKR. 
The freeze  applies until  1 January  1999,  the date  planned  for  the  introduction of the 
single currency. Obviously, this temporarily affects the level of Community support from 
one  Member State to  another.  In view of the  operative events determining the ACRs 
applied to the aid concerned, 
10 several rates will remain frozen until 30 June 1999. As the 
aid  was  established  in  ecus,  the  balance  between  different  agricultural  sectors  thus 
changes in national currency, particularly in  Sweden. 
7 
8 
9 
10 
OJ No L 312,23.12.1995, p.7. Amended by Regulation (EC) No 1451/96 (OJ L  187, 26.7.1996, 
p.1). 
Regulation (EEC) No 3813/92 (OJ L 387, 31.12.1992, p.1). Last amended by Regulation (EC) No 
150/95 (OJ L 22, 31.1.1995, p.1). 
Flat-rate  aid expressed  in  ecus  per hectare  or per  livestock  unit  and  aid  of a  structural  or 
environmental nature. 
The ACR as it stands on the date of the operative event is applied to the amount concerned. For 
aid per hectare established in the framework of  the reform of the CAP, the date of the operative 
event is  1 July;  for most of the other aid referred to in  Article. 7 of Regulation 3813/92, it  is  1 
January. 
6 Gaps between frozen ACRs and RMRs are  fairly  small for  the currencies that revalued 
in June and July 1995. However, the gap between the frozen ACR and the RMR for the 
SKR has become quite considerable in the case of per hectare aid:  for  the  1996/97 crop 
year, aid in  Sweden will be  11% higher than the level of the current ACR. 
4.  Compensatory aid for appreciable declines in ACRs 
The  compensatory aid  that  can be  granted  under  Regulations  (EC)  No  1527/95  and 
No 2990/95  is  limited by  a ceiling established on the  basis of the effects expected to 
ensue from appreciable declines in ACRs and on that of the latest figures for disposable 
incomes. The aid comprises three twelve-month degressive tranches,  50% of which is 
financed by the Union irrespective of the national contribution in the form of additional 
financing by the Member State. 
By the end of 1995/96, the six Member States concerned by Regulation (EC) No 1527/95 
had notified plans for compensatory aid. The Commission raised no  objections to  these 
plans.  - ·· 
Sweden, which has a further six months to notify aid under Regulation (EC) No 2990/95, 
did  not submit plans for a scheme during the period under review. 
Luxembourg and  Germany  decided to  grant the  maximum  possible aid,  using national 
funds  to  double the compensation financed  by  the  EAGGF.  Belgium plans to  provide 
additional aid equal to  15% of the maximum authorized, on top of the 50% supplied by 
the  EU.  Denmark, the Netherlands and Austria are not providing additional aid. 
Unlike the other Member States, which allocate aid direct to farmers on the basis of past 
output, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands have opted for flat-rate allocation for the 
third tranche, since amounts would have been less than ECU 400 per holding. 
5.  Compensation for effects of devaluations hy other Member States 
In view of  the consequences of  the major devaluations early in 1995, the Council adopted 
Regulation (EC) No 2611/95,  authorizing  the  Member States to  grant national  aid  in 
compensation for losses of agricultural income caused by devaluations by other Member 
States before 31  December 1995. The aid is subject to the Commission's approval, and 
it must be degressive over a maximum of three years. It should not encourage production 
of any particular product in  relation to  the situation that would have obtained had the 
devaluation not occurred. 
France and Belgium notified planned aid schemes before the deadline of 30 June 1996. 
The schemes comprise a single annual tranche to  offset the effects in the beef and veal 
sector of the devaluation of the LIT. The Commission raised no objections, since both 
national markets were directly or indirectly heavily dependent on the Italian market. 
7 6.  Summary of agri-monetary compensatory aid 
The following table summarizes aid notified and authorized. All amounts arc expressed 
in  millions of ccus on  the  basis of the  RMR on  1 July  1996.  The  second and  third 
tranchcs of compensation for  appreciable decline in  ACRs amount respectively to  two 
thirds and one third of the first tranche, which is  shown in the table. 
Member State  Appreciable  Ceiling  Notified EU  Notified 
decline in  (ECU  financing  national 
ACR (%)  million)  (ECU million)  financing 
(ECU 
million) 
Regulation (EC) 
No  1527/95 
Bclginm  2.193  40.2  20.5  6.1 
Luxembourg  2.193  3.2  1.6  1.6 
Denmark  . 0.496  8.0  4.0  0.0 
Germany  2.229  216.7  108.3  108.3 
Netherlands  2.572  101.4  50.7  0 
Austria  2.264  38.7  19.4  0  . 
Regulation (EC) 
No 2990/95 
Sweden  1.734  20.8  - -
Regulation (EC) 
No 2611/95 
Belgium  - - 0  3.3 
France  - - 0  17.3 
7.  Conversion rates for import charges 
Commission  Regulation  (EC)  No  1482/95  introduces  transitional  measures  for 
determining the conversion rate to be applied to import charges defined in ecus.  This rate 
is fixed once a month in cases where the annual rate provided for in the Customs Code 
should have  applied.  The  Commission subsequently  extended  the  application of the 
transitional monthly rate for a further year, since the Council and Parliament had not yet 
completed consideration of  the Commission's proposal to amend the annual rate provided 
for in the ,Customs Code by 30 June 1996. 
However, this transitional monthly rate is applicable only to  the import charges that are 
not fixed by an instrument under the CAP within the meaning of Article 1 of the basic 
8 agri-monctary Regulation. In other cases, the agricultural conversion rate is applied. The 
usc of two different conversion rates has led to certain economic inconsistencies and has 
greatly  complicated  administration,  with  concomitant  scope  for  errors  and  legal 
uncertainty. In February 1996 the Commission accordingly proposed to amend the agri-
monctary  arrangements  in  such  a  way  as  to  eliminate  the  usc  of the  agricultural 
conversion rate, and to usc only one rate for import charges on agricultural products. By 
30 June 1996, the Council had not yet reached a decision on this proposal. 
8.  General remarks on economic effects 
In  theory,  the ACR will  affect only those market prices that arc closely  linked to  an 
intervention mechanism (mainly in the sectors of  cereals, sugar, milk and beef/veal). The 
development of ACRs may thus have an impact on farni incomes through the prices of 
those products. Moreover, problems in trade may arise when divergences appear either 
between ACRs and RMRs, or between market prices and intervention prices in national 
currency. 
The prices of other products, on the other hand, arc  not affected by ACRs. However, 
trade in those products may  be distorted by sudden major changes in  the RMRs. This 
happens, in particular, when market prices in national currency do  not follow currency 
movements. 
As well as the impact of currency movements on prices, farm incomes arc subject to the 
direct effects of the ACRs applicable to direct aid to producers. 
9.  Effects on market prices 
As there were no major devaluations, the movements in ACRs with the greatest potential 
repercussions in  1995/96 were: 
substantial steady revaluation of the LIT (12.1%) and the SKR (9.9%); 
appreciable revaluation of the BLF, DKR, OM, HFL and OS  in June and July 
1995, and of the SKR ·in Jariuary  1996. 
· For products with no  intervention  mechanism  influencing  market  prices,  there  is,  as 
expected, no observable link between movement of  those prices and movements of  ACRs. 
For other products, observation of prices has concentrated on sectors where there arc 
usable figures, pinpointing one representative market for each Member State concerned. 
During the period under review, the market· prices of cereals were substantially higher 
than intervention prices in· national currency. At this unusual level, markets react hardly 
at all to small agri-monetary fluctuations. However, despite very wide variations, there 
is no contradiction on the whole between the general trend of market prices and that of 
intervention  prices  in  national  currency  ..  'The  tendency  is  broadly  similar,  even  if 
correlations are very loose and calling in question the existence of  a relationship between 
cause and effect. Despite slight uncertainty, in the 1995/96 context of  high market prices, 
revaluations do  not seem to  have  been passed on in agri-monetary declines  in cereal 
pnces. 
9 Market prices for skimmed-milk powder and for  butter remained exceptionally high in 
the  first  half. of the  1995/96  marketing  year.  No  link  is  observable  between  the 
revaluations of  the LIT and the SKR on the one hand, and market prices on the other. For 
those currencies whose value increased appreciably in June and July 1995, market prices 
clearly did not follow ACRs downwards. Had there been no appreciable revaluation, it 
is hardly likely that prices in the currencies in question would have increased, or have 
increased more than they did. 
Prices for the meat of young bovine animals declined sharply early in  1995, nearing or 
even reaching  the  level  for  triggering  intervention.  Towards the  end  of 1995,  prices 
recovered strongly up to the time the bovine spongiform encephalopathy crisis broke. Just 
before the period under review, between March and July 1995,  the decline in prices in 
certain Member States was probably partly influenced by  prices in LIT, which did  not 
increase as fast as ACRs. After July 1995, low prices in LIT remained stable, and as they 
had not increased earlier, they did not follow the downward movement to keep pace with 
ACRs.  Market prices  in  SKR,  another  currency  that  appreciated  strongly  during  the 
1995/96  marketing  year,  followed  the  decline  in  the  ACR  fairly  closely.  For  the 
currencies that revalued appreciably early in the marketing year, the downward movement 
in ACRs most probably affected the development of market prices for bovines,  unlike 
those for cereals and milk products. 
10.  Effects on trade 
Any monetary effects on trade arc masked, in the short term, by  wide variations in  the 
monthly value of exports.  For the Member States trading with those whose currencies 
have depreciated strongly, the figures do not show significant links between total exports · 
of any particular product group and short-term currency movements. 
Among other possible short-term agri-monctary effects, deflection of  trade may in theory 
occur for products attracting export refunds when the aggregate monetary gap widens. 
However,  export  figures  do  not  show  any  development  that  could  be  attributed  to 
monetary gaps. This docs not mean that there have not been isolated instances, but even 
where aggregate gaps have been very wide over two months, as happened at the end of 
1995, no systematically organized network \Vas set up, since there is no certainty that the 
situation will last. 
Over longer periods, the figures  do however show certain links.  From  1992 to  1995, 
indices of  competitiv~ncss, which reflect currency trends and the development of costs, 
were  progressing in  line  with  exports  expressed  in  deflated  national· currencies,  i.e. 
constant in terms of purchasing power. However, the impact of competitiveness app.ears 
only in increased profits on exports. It is not apparent in terms of quantities exported or 
market shares. 
11.  Effects on incomes 
A number of assumptions and approximations were adopted in order to circumscribe an 
order of magnitude for the effects of ACRs in 1995/96 on twelve months of income. 
10 According to calculations based on a theoretical model grouping all the consequences of 
ACRs over twelve months, it would appear that their impact on incomes was significant, 
and unevenly spread over the Member States. 
The impact of the year-on-year change in ACRs from  1994/95  to  1995/96 was fairly 
limited,  and  did  not  exceed  2%  for  most of the  Member  States.  However,  in  three 
Member States the positive impact was significant: 
+ 7.2% in Sweden, owing to the increase in per hectare aid; 
+ 4.1% in Italy and + 4.5% in the United Kingdom, owing to increases in prices 
and in aid, the latter accounting for two thirds of  the effect in Italy and half in the 
UK. 
Altogether, the impact on net income from farming is estimated at I.7%, or ECU I  559 
million. 
All  the Member States benefited from the effect of the agri-monetary arrangements by 
comparison with  the  situation  that would  have  obtained  had  the  RMR been  applied 
directly- in place of the ACR in  1995/96. 
The largest benefit in terms of incomes was once again recorded in Sweden (+ 8.8%). 
Significant benefits were also felt in Luxembourg(+ 5.6%), Germany(+ 4.6%), Belgium 
and Denmark(+ 3.8%). The benefit was less marked in Austria(+ 2.5%), since national 
aid, which constitutes a major component of incomes, was not affected. 
farm incomes in the Netherlands, Ireland, Italy and Spain were about 2% better than they 
would otherwise have been, and the benefit was smaller in the other Member States, at 
around  1% or less in Greece and Portugal. Altogether, the  impact on net income from 
farming is estimated at  1. 9%, or ECU 1 718 million. 
12.  The budget and the legacy of earlier periods 
In the agri-monetary area, the Community budget is  strongly affected by the legacy of 
the switch-over mechanism (or "green ecu"). This mechanism, introduced in 1984, was 
discontinued from 1 february 1995. It resulted in a general increase of almost 20% of 
prices and amounts expressed in ecus, which cancelled out the effects of bringing the 
conversion rates used in agriculture back to a realistic level. 
The effects of the green ecu mechanism,  reflected  in  the  increase in prices  in ecus, 
involve expenditure of ECU 6 800 million for the 1996 budget and ECU 6 920 million 
for the 1997 budget. 
The effects of the green ecu, passed on through world market prices, are estimated to 
result in an additional cost of ECU 1 320 million a year. 
Price reductions due to agri-monetary causes in I990 and I993, accounting for 1.46% of 
the total, brought about further savings of around ECU 340 million a year. 
II Altogether, the residual effects of past agri-monctary problems involve a cost of about 
ECU  7 800  to  7 900  million  a  year,  almost  20%  of EAGGF  Guarantee  section 
expenditure. 
13.  The cost·of agri-monetary developments in  1995/96 
The figures in the table below show an annual cost of  about ECU  1 200 to 1 300 million. 
This cost is in addition to that of the residual effects from earlier periods. 
Almost two thirds of the cost of developments in  1995/96 (ECU 800 to  900 million) is 
due  to  the effects of permitted margins.  The reason margins entail  a cost is  basically 
attributable to the asymmetry of  the mechanism, whereby positive monetary gaps can rise 
to 5 points while negative gaps arc usually limited by a variable threshold determined by 
the  maximum  positive  gap  minus  5  points.  Moreover,  in  situations  of steady  and 
significant appreciation for several currencies, like that obtaining in 1995/96, the duration 
of confirmation periods plays an  important role in keeping the  largest positive gaps in 
existen~ over time. 
The cost of operative events, which is  difficult to  compress without distorting markets, 
is  about ECU 100  million a  year.  Independently of any  ACR,  this  cost  is  due  to  the 
monetary  development between  the  date  of the  operative  event  (event  by  which  the 
objective  of the  operation  is  reached)  for  the  amount  in  question  and  the  date  of 
comptabilisation of the' expense in  the budget execution. This result is  unusually  high 
because there was no offsetting, in 1995/96, between currencies that appreciated and those 
that depreciated. 
The cost due to  freezing ACRs gradually rises, because of operative events, eventually 
reaching  ECU 185  million.  As the  freeze  will  continue  until  1 January  1999,  it  also 
affects the budget for 2000. 
The cost of compensatory aids  could  be  reduced  as  from  1997  in  order  to  take  into 
account the devaluations occurred after the appreciable revaluations which justified these 
aids. 
(ECU million) 
Cost of agri-monetary  1996  1997  1998  1999 
developments 1995/96 
ACR freeze  111  180  185  185 
Compensatory aid  201  141  70  2 
Permitted margins  817  890  916  913 
Operative events  107  104  - -
Total  1 236  1 315  1 171  1 100 
12 In 1996, the main beneficiary under the agri-monctary arrangements was Sweden, with 
increased expenditure in SKR of 11.2%. This is the result of the effects of the margins 
and operative events in a context of strong currency appreciation.  In the future, even if 
these effects disappear, Sweden would still be a major beneficiary under the arrangements 
owing to the freeze on ACRs, whose effects will become significant from  1997. 
The  second  beneficiary  under  the  arrangements  in  1996  is  Italy,  where  Community 
expenditure has increased by  5.6%. This is  linked to  the appreciation of the LIT in the 
period under review, and will not necessarily be lasting. 
Expenditure increased by 3.8% to  4.7% in the States where ACRs were frozen in June 
and  July  1995,  where  the  currency  situation  has  moderated  the  effects of permitted 
margins; this could change. 
The impact of the Council Decisions of June 1995, i.e. the freeze on ACRs and the flat-
rate compensatory aid in place of Articles 7 and 8 of Regulation (EEC) No 3813/92, can 
be assessed by estimating the cost that would have been incurred under the agri-monetary 
arrangements  had  those  Decisions  not  been  adopted.  The  savings  amount  to  almost 
ECU 8 900 million over four years, or on average over ECU 2 200 a year. 
The enormous cost of Articles 7 and 8 of Regulation (EEC) No  3813/92 seems to  be 
mainly due to the level of per hectare aid in SKR (which would have been 10% higher 
in  ccus if maintained in  SKR).  Supposing Article  7 to  have  been  applied only to  the 
appreciable revaluations of June and July 1995, the extra cost, in  relation to  the actual 
situation, .would still have been almost ECU 2 500 for the four years 1996 to  1999. 
B.  Analysis, outlook and proposals 
1.  General view 
Observation  of  the  agri-monetary  arrangements  over  the  period  1995/96  reveals 
difficulties with technical, economic arid financial aspects. Some of  these difficulties may 
become serious problems, depending on how the situation develops. 
.  . 
Three major developments need to be taken into account: economic and monetary union, 
enlargement of  the European Union, and the future of  the CAP. The proposals to be made 
depend not only on the urgency and seriousness of  the agri-monetary problems to be dealt 
with, but also on the options and· timing resulting from these three developments. 
2.  Financial difficulties 
In the financial context there is  no escaping the legacy of the past; recent events show 
how the agri-monetary arrangements can assume considerable importance over a very few 
years. The costs of the present arrangements arc high, but considerably less than they 
would have been if the mechanisms originally planned for appreciable revaluations had 
been  applied.  This  consideration  fully  vindicates  the  Council's  ad  hoc  decisions .  on 
compensatory aid and the freezing of  certain ACRs. The costs of  the ad hoc measures can. 
13 be  seen  to  be  fairly  moderate,  even  though  some  of them  could  have  been  further 
compressed, since the economic necessity of  certain measures is not clear: particular, flat-
rate compensation for loss of income for price reductions that did not actually occur. 
The costs link<;:d  to  operative events arc unavoidable in  relation to  the operation of the 
CAP,  but  the  main  costs,  linked  to  permitted  margins,  depend  on  the  choice  of 
mechanisms under the agri-monetary arrangements. 
However, as margins constitute a sensitive system based on  fragile equilibria, it would 
be  dangerous to  tamper with single components  in  isolation from  the  whole.  But the 
system of permitted  margins  as  a  whole  is  in  fact  the  mainstay  of the  present agri-
monetary arrangements. 
3.  Economic difficulties 
Almost all farmers benefit economically from the agri-monctary arrangements, although 
the  extent of their benefit varies according  to  the  relative  currency  situation and,  for 
different reasons, to the stability of the national currencies concerned. Effects on markets 
vary  with the  products concerned and,  for  the  most sensitive, with the level  of prices 
recorded in relation to guaranteed institutional prices. In the  longer term, trade may be 
affected,  at  least  in  value,  by  the  index  of competitiveness  which  reflects  currency 
developments, adjusted for prices. 
Thus,  while  the  economic  effects  of the  agri-monctary  arrangements  arc  usually 
acceptable, they may occasionally lead to substantial distortion between Member States. 
To  some  extent,  these  potential  problems  also  result  from  the  system  of permitted 
margins. 
When currency developments arc not passed on, which happens with the freeze on certain 
ACRs applicable to direct aid to producers, there is a possibility of long-term structural 
divergence, either between Member States, or between agricultural sectors in  the same 
Member State.  Moreover,  it  may  become  increasingly  difficult  to  envisage  return  to 
equilibrium at a common level  in ecus.  ' 
When currency developments arc passed on only partially and with some delay, which 
happens with products for which 'there is no  intervention mechanism, divergences may 
emerge  in  the  medium to  long  term,  either between  prices. recorded  in  the  different 
Member States or within overall trade. 
When  currency. developments  are  fully  passed  on,  through  guaranteed  prices,  the 
movement  in  incomes  and  prices  for  the  products  concerned  may  diverge  from  the 
general development of prices and incomes. 
In all cases, depending on the economic situation and circumstances, major difficulties 
may occur, mainly in the long term. This means that the best system is not one that is 
14 fixed for ever, but one that can be adapted to  the agricultural and monetary background 
and to  the risks most likely to materialize. 
4.  Technical difficulties 
From  the  technical  point  of view,  certain  aspects  of the  present  arrangements  arc 
somewhat incoherent and sometimes contribute to the economic and financial difficulties 
described above. They mainly relate to the impact of the revaluation, the conversion rate 
used for import charges and the timing of changes to ACRs. 
Some measure of the impact of currency revaluation and decline in ACRs is  required: it 
enables past currency developments to be taken into account when assessing the possible 
consequences of the present currency revaluation.  However, experience has shown the 
present approach based on the definition of  "appreciable" revaluations to be unsatisfactory 
and excessively complex. 
Currency developments _causing  the  same "appreciable" decline  in  the  ACR may  have 
quite different effects on incomes, i.e. their practical impact may be totally different. for 
example, two currencies which have been stable for two years arc treated the same way 
if the level of the ACR at the end of the third year is below its initial level. However, it 
is  perfectly conceivable that one of the currencies might have been  I 5% down for  I I 
months  of the  third  year,  and  the  other  for  only  one  month,  prior  to  appreciable 
revaluation:  the agri-monctary benefit to  farmers during the third year is  consequently 
very different. 
An appreciable decline in the ACR is based on the confirmation of monetary gaps over 
· five  reference  periods.  It is  important  to  set a  limit  on  the  period,  given  the  risk of 
deflection of trade flows; but steps must be taken to prevent currency movements in the 
opposite direction just after the  appreciable revaluation.  Clearly, a decline in  the ACR 
lasting,  for example,  two months would not have the same effects as  the same decline 
lasting a full  year. In this context, the duration of the reference periods, about  I 0 days, 
is  a vital  factor in the equilibrium of the system as a whole. 
The usc of the twofold conversion system tor import charges on agricultural products is 
unnecessarily complicated, leading to  economic inconsistency and  to  disputes.  As this 
twofold system docs not make any practical difference to the Community preferences, it 
should be abandoned, as proposed by the Commission. 
The rules  for  changing ACRs make  up the  fragile  system of permitted  margins.  for 
example, under one of the rules, an exceptional three-day reference period is  triggered 
when any aggregate bilateral monetary gap exceeds six points. Where this rule is applied, 
it contributes to the instability of ACRs: in particular, it upsets the established calendar 
for  changes  in  rates,  on which  operators  base their  expectations.  This rule  has  been 
criticized for its shortcomings. 
The rule was introduced by the Commission for the practical implementation of the agri-
monetary arrangements in. order to avoid a delay of 10 days, or safeguard measures, in 
15 cases of sudden major currency movements. Experience of iong reference periods before 
an appreciable revaluation has called into question the economic justification for this rule. 
But the  rule  docs  sometimes contribute  to  shortening the  overall  confirmation period 
before- appreciable  revaluation.  It would  once  again  be  economically justifiable  if a 
sudden and  very substantial devaluation occurred, creating gaps even larger than those 
recorded in 1995. This rule too is very closely tied in with the whole system of  permitted 
margins, on which the present agri-monctary arrangements are based. 
5.  Imnact of monetary and agricultural outlook 
The  third  stage  of economic  and  monetary  union,  from  1  January  1999,  rs  quite 
exceptionally important for the future of the agri-monctary arrangements. 
Among the Member States that adopt the curo, agri-monctary arrangements will no longer 
be needed, since fixed amounts will be paid direct in curos. However, the transition from 
the present arrangements to a system of direct payments in  curos implies that monetary 
gaps between agricultural conversion rates and market rates will be eliminated. For prices 
and amounts linked to the markets, these gaps may not exceed a lower limit of -2 or an 
upper limit of +5, nor may the sum of the gaps for any two currencies exceed 5 points. 
However, in view of the  freeze  on certain ACRs, gaps arc  not limited for most of the 
direct aid to producers. 
The extent of the effort needed will depend, at the end of 1998, on the currency situation 
and the market prices of the products with a guaranteed institutional price. 
For the other Member States, those which do not adopt the euro on 1 January 1999,  agri-
monetary arrangements will still be needed, if only so that payments to  settle prices and 
amounts  fixed  in  euros  can  be  made  in  national  currencies  without  distortion of the 
markets. The arrangements will also affect relations between the Member States which 
have kept their national currency on the one hand, and those which have adopted the euro 
on the other.  However, the currency situation and perhaps the agricultural situation as 
well may be quite different from that obtaining at present.  · 
The agri-monctary arrangements need to be ·adapted to the new situation. Even if it were 
possible to conserve the same principles, the arrangements themselves would need to be 
reviewed. First, as the new arrangements must take account of the risk of variations in 
national currencies against the euro, they must also allow for  the relations that will be 
established between the Member States that do and those that do not use the euro, and 
of the possible role of new accessions. 
Secondly, the arrangements must  be adaptable to possible developments of the CAP, in 
particular in terms of the  prospects of enlargement of the  European Union.  The key 
factors here will be the level of guaranteed prices, and the level and uniformity of direct 
aid to producers. 
16 6.  Proposals 
According to  the calendar for economic and monetary union, the usc of the curo by  the 
Member States that qualify will be introduced on  1 January 1999. This date sets a time 
limit on revising the agri-monctary arrangements. Relevant Commission proposals must 
be  presented by early 1998, at the latest, for a Council decision in the light of the most 
recent available information on the monetary and agricultural situation. 
With the prospect of major and imminent revision of the agri-monetary arrangements, it 
is not a very good idea, at the end of 1996, to consider any significant changes other than 
the strictly essential, which will in any case need to be reconsidered after 1997. However, 
in view of the problems that will arise for the transition between national currencies and 
the euro, it is  best not to  aggravate situations and risks created by the freeze  on ACRs 
when appreciable revaluations take place. 
For cases similar to those of appreciable revaluations in  1995/96, care should be taken 
to ensure similar treatment, that does not create discrimination between Member States. 
However, agreement not to  reduce the ACRs should be limited at least by the maxima 
reached by the SKR, i.e.  12.8% in the case of aid where the operative event occurs on 
1 July, and 6.9% in other cases. To keep potential problems even smaller and to avoid 
reproducing the differences in support between different sectors that arose for the SKR, 
the ACR should never be frozen for  reductions in  excess of 6.9%. If this limit were to 
mean cutting some aid  in  national currency,  the  effects could  be  offset by  degressive 
compensatory aid to cover any loss of income due to appreciable revaluations. 
According to present rules, if there is  no devaluation, the appreciable revaluation of the 
LIT will not be of the same type as those which occurred in  1995/96. If  the ACR for the 
LIT remains unchanged, the conditions for applying compensatory aid retrospectively as 
laid  down in  Article 8 of the  basic agri-monctary  Regulation will  be  realized in  May 
1997. If there is  a further decline in  the ACR for  the LIT meanwhile, even if it is  not 
deemed to be an appreciable decline in the ACR within the meaning of Article l  of the 
basic Regulation, this may lead to the. application of Article 8 before May 1997, or even 
trigger the conditions for a general.ris.e in most direct aid to producers, exp'ressed in ecus, 
in accordance with Article 7.  , 
In all  cases, appreciable revaluations may be dealt with by means of ad hoc  measures 
decided by the Council pursuant to Article 9 of Regulation (EEC) No .3813/92 and in the 
light of the actual circumstances arising. In this framework the Commission will make 
appropriate  proposals  for  cases  arising  for  the  LIT,  or  according  to  the  guidelines 
described above for similar cases of appreciable revaluations in the period 1995/96. 
Altogether, the conclusions can be summarized in four points: 
no  change  should  be  made  to  the  general  way  the  present  agri-monetary 
arrangements function pending their revision with a  view to the third stage of 
economic and monetary union on 1 January 1999; 
17 where possible and necessary, rules should be  simplified without compromising 
the  sy_stem  as  a  whole,  which  means discontinuing the  use  of the  agricultural 
conversion rate for import charges, as already proposed to the Council; 
future appreciable revaluations should be dealt with, but disparities resulting from 
freezing  ACRs  should  not  be  aggravated,  for  they  would  interfere  with  the 
changeover to the euro; 
without prejudice to the Commission's proposals, study and analysis of  the present 
agri-monetary  arrangements  and  possible  future  approaches  should  continue, 
especially among the experts of the agri-monetary management committee. 
Consequently, there is no imniediate call for the Commission to present a new proposal 
for a Council regulation to adapt the agri-monetary arrangements. 
18 II.  ANALYSIS OF AGRI-MONETARY EFFECTS IN 1995/96 
A.  . Currency developments 
1.  Representative market rates 
2  . 
Unlike the preceding 12 months, the period July 1995 to June 1996 (1995/96) saw 
no dramatic currency fluctuations\ movements remaining fairly even, except for 
the  FMK  and  DRA,  and  relatively  moderate,  except  for  the  LIT  and  SKR. 
Nevertheless,  such  movements  arc  by  no  means  typical  for  at  least  half the 
Community currencies. Taking the  possible over-reactions to  the change in the 
dollar in early  1995  into account, the traditionally strong currencies declined in 
value while those with a history of depreciation strengthened. 
During the  period under review,  the dollar rose  against the  ccu  to  reverse the 
-trend over the previous 18 months from early 1994. The representative market rate 
(RMR) for the dollar thus fell  by 6.8%, after rising by  16.7%
2
• 
Generally speaking, this change in the trend for the dollar was reflected in similar 
movements for the LIT,  PTA and  SKR, with inverse movements for the BLF, 
OM, FMK, OS and HFL. 
The RMRs for the BLF, DM, OS  and HFL rose by nearly 2.5%, insufficient to 
offset their falls of around 4% over the preceding  18  months but bringing them 
back to their approximate levels of early  1995. 
Depreciation of the  FMK began  late,  in  December  1995,  but  despite  its  scale 
(7%),  it  did  not  cancel  out  the  revaluation  of nearly  13%  over  the  period 
January 1994 to  November 1995. However, since March 1996 the RMR for the 
FMK has reached the ·level applying on Finland's accession on I January 1995. 
The LIT and  PTA have  fallen  back below their  levels of early  1995  despite 
devaluations of  around 14% and 5% respectively between January and April  1995. 
The RMRs for those currencies fell  by 11.5% and 1.5% during the twelve-month 
period under consideration. 
A 6% depreciation in the SKR over the first five months of 1995 was made good 
by October of  that year. In June 1996, the RMR for the SKR stood 7% below the 
level obtaining on Sweden's a~ccssion. 
See Tables and Graphs AI to A4 in  Working Paper on Basic lnfonnation. 
Under the  agri-monetary  arrangements,  the conversion  rates  express  the  value of one  ecu  in 
. national currency. A devaluation against the ecu therefore corresponds to an increase in those rates, 
while a revaluation is  equivalent to a reduction. 
19 During the 12 months under examination, the RMR for the ORA continued to rise 
fairly steadily, but there has been a reversal in this trend since March 1996. The 
DKR and the ESC have remained more or less stable. The previous tendency of 
. the IRL and the UKL to depreciate switched to relative stability and even tended 
towards  appreciation  in May and  June  1996.  The FF  has  continued to  show a 
constant, albeit very slight, tendency to  appreciate against the ecu. 
2.  Agricultural conversion rates 
3 
4 
s 
Since  the  switch-over  mechanism  was  discontinued  on  1  February  1995,  all 
agricultural  conversion  rates  (ACRs)  move  up  and  down  in  line  with 
representative market rates (RMRs).
3 However, the mechanism for aligning ACRs 
on RMRs is not symmetrical. Larger monetary gaps, and longer reference periods 
for  their  observation,  are  needed  to  trigger  a  reduction  in  the  ACR after  a 
currency  has appreciated  (i.e.  after  a  decline  in  institutional  prices  in national 
currency)  than  to  trigger  an  increase  in  the  ACR  following  depreciation.  In 
-accordance with those mechanisms and  movements in  currencies, the ACRs for 
the  BLF,  ESC,  FF  and  IRL  remained  unchanged  during  the  period  under 
consideration,  which  is  also  true  for  the  DKR and  the  PTA  following  their 
July 1995  revaluation.  Apart  from  those  for  the  LIT  and  the  SKR,  which 
underwent  a  substantial  revaluation,  the  other  ACRs  rose  fairly  slightly  but 
sometimes rather frequently. 
Generally  speaking, the  monetary  gaps for  all  currencies  remained  positive or 
close to zero. Given their tendency to revalue substantially, the LIT and the SKR 
alternately  maintained  positive  monetary  gaps  in  excess  of four  points.  The 
available  margin  for  negative  gaps  was  thus  always very  small at  below one 
point
4
,  triggering a large number of small or very small devaluations of less than 
0.5% in  82% of cases. 
Shortly after the Council's agri-monetary decisions of June 1995, five currencies 
underwent  "appreciable"  falls
5  in  their ACRs. In  the  case of the currencies  in 
question,  this  terminated  five  months  of  positive  monetary  gaps  standing 
constantly or intermittently at above five points. 
The "appreciable" part of the reduction  in the· ACR for  the  BLF amounted to 
2.193%  at  24 June 1995.  The  figures  for  the  OM, the  OS  and  the  HFL  were 
See Tables and Graphs A4  to AS  in  Working Paper on  Basic Information. 
Where  the  "aggregate"  gap  made  up  of the  largest  positive  gap  and  the  largest  negative  gap 
exceeds 5 points over a certain number of  reference periods, ACRs must be adjusted to reduce the 
monetary gaps. 
An "appreciable" reduction  in  the ACR is  one  leading to  a reduction  in  institutional  prices  in 
national currency that is greater than the effects of  any devaluation occurring during the preceding 
three years. These effects are estimated as two thirds of the increase in  institutional prices due to 
changes in the ACR occurring between 12 and 24 months previously, and one third of  the increase 
between 24 and 36 months previously. 
20 2.229%, 2.264% and 2.572% respectively at 1 July  1995. Subsequently, the ACR 
for  the  DKR underwent  an  "appreciable"  of 0.496%  on  24 July 1995.  In the 
following months the positive monetary gaps for those currencies declined, with 
·those for the DM, HFL and OS even becoming negative in May and June 1996, 
calling for slight increases in the ACR. 
Of  the other currencies, those with stable or practically stable ACRs had monetary 
gaps of around + 1 (ESC) or around + 2 (FF). The gap for the IRL generally 
remained below + 2,  before rising swiftly to + 4 from May to June 1996. There 
was a "non-appreciable" revaluation of 2.9% in the PTA at the end of  July 1995  . 
.  Subsequently, the monetary gap for the PTA stabilized at somewhat below four 
points. 
The ACR for the LIT underwent four "non-appreciable" reductions, amounting to 
12.1% in total, during the period concerned, though the. monetary gaps remained 
positive and large. 
The ACR for the SKR fell three times, the total reduction amounting to 9.9%. The 
fall  of 11  January 1996  was  "appreciable"  in  respect of 1.734%.  The  rather 
variable monetary gaps generally remained very high at above four points, while 
a further appreciable fall  in the ACR took place on 7 July 1996. 
The ACRs were devalued substantially for two currencies only, namely the DRA 
and  the  FMK.  The  rise  was  3.1%  in  the  case  of the  DRA,  where  the  gap 
nonetheless  became  positive  at  the  end  of the  period  under  review.  After 
· maintaining  gaps  of close  to  5%  for  five  to  six  months,  the  FMK  finally 
depreciated, with a resulting increase of 3.5% in the ACR. Variations in the UKL 
resulted in a rise of 1.9% in the corresponding ACR for  over six months, but in 
late June 1996 that rate eventually stood 0.8% below its original level. 
B.  Agri-monetary mechanisms 
1.  Regulatory provisions 
6 
In late June  1995  when a  risk of "appreciable" revaluation arose for the BLF, 
DKR,  DM,  HFL  and  OS,  Council  Regulation  (EC) No 1527/95  provided for 
specific  measures  covering  such  revaluations  between  23 June 1995  and 
1 January 1996.  In  late  December 1995,  when  further  risks  of "appreciable" 
revaluations  arose  for  the  FMK  and  the  SKR,  Council  Regulation  (EC) 
No 2990/95
6 provided for measures similar to those laid down by Regulation (EC) 
No 1527/95,  to  apply  until  30 June 1996  and  subsequently  until 
31  December 1996. 
OJ No L  312, 23.12.1995, p.7. Last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1451196 (OJ No L  187,' 
26.7  .1996, p.l  ). 
21 These measures,  which  were  deemed  necessary  in  particular  with  a  view  to 
compliance with obligations under the GATT agreement and budgetary discipline, 
suspend the application of  Articles 7 and 8 of  the basic agri-monetaryRegulation
7
• 
· Article 7 provides for an increase in ecus in most types of direct aid to producers
8 
in the event of a revaluation of a greater size than the  devaluations of the two 
preceding years, with a view to avoiding any reduction in the value of the aid in 
the currency in question. In view of the scale of the aid concerned in terms of the 
budget (over 60% of  the EAGGF Guarantee Section), such a measure would cost 
approximately  ECU 250 million  a  year for  each  percentage  point  revaluation. 
Article 8 of Regulation (EC) No 3813/92 also provides for compensatory aid for 
income losses due to the effects on prices of reductions in the ACRs. The aid in 
question can only be granted after  12  months' observation showing that there is 
a lasting fall  in the ACR. The latter is established, where necessary, on the basis 
of the fall  in farm incomes incurred and which can in principle be observed. 
In place of the measures laid down in Articles 7 and 8 of the basic agri-monetary 
Regulation, Regulations (EEC) No  1527/95  and No  2990/95  introduce  flat-rate 
compensatory aid and a freeze on the agricultural conversion rates applicable to 
direct aid covered by abovementioned Article 7. 
(a)  Compensatory  aid  provided  for  under  Regulations  (EEC)  No  1527/95  and 
No 2990/95 is subject to a ceiling for the Member States at risk of "appreciable" 
reductions  in  their  ACRs.  These  ceilings  were  calculated  on  the  basis of the 
anticipated effects of  appreciable reductions in ACRs, using the latest statistics of 
incomes available, regarding 1994 and expressed as a percentage appreciable fall 
in  the  ACR.  The  aid  comprises  three  degressive  tranchcs,  the  first  of which 
(covering -the  12  months  following  that  of the  revaluation  in  question)  may 
amount to up to 100% of the ceiling. The following two annual tranches may not 
exceed two thirds and one third of the ceiling respectively. The European Union 
finances  50% of the ceiling irrespective of the national  contribution which the 
Member State may supply in addition. In principle the aid can be granted from 
the ·month following the revaluation in  question, unlike the  aid  provided for in 
Article 8 of Regulation (EEC) No 3813/92, which requires at least 12 months to 
elapse.  The  detailed  rules  for  the· application  of the  aid  arc  laid  do·wn  in 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 2921195
9
• 
7 
8 
9 
In accordance with the detailed rules of application, the aid must be  granted to 
agricultural holdings in annual payments. It must vary with the size of the latter 
over a period in the past and must be in line with the macro-economic spread of 
the  income loss between the various sectors of production affected.  However, 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 3813/92 (OJ No L 387, 31.12.1992). Last amended by Regulation 
(EC) No 150/95 (OJ No L 22, 31.7.1995, p.1). 
Flat-rate  aid  expressed  in  ccus ·per hectare  or  per .livestock  unit  and  aid  of a  structural  or 
environmental nature. 
OJ  No L  305,  19.12.1995,  p.60.  Last  amended  by  Regulation  (EC) No 1481/96  (OJ No  L  188, 
27.6.1996, p. 21).' 
22 where  annual  payments  per  holding  arc  less  than  ECU 400,  the  aid  may  be 
granted for measures in the collective and general interest or those for which the 
Community provisions authorize national aiel. 
The compensatory aid  measures notified  by  the  Member States arc outlined  in 
point 2 below. 
(b)  The freeze  on  the  ACRs for  aid  proviclccl  for  in  Article 7  of the  basic  agri-
monctary Regulation relates to the ACRs actually applied on 23  June 1995  (or 
11  January 1996 in the case of the SKR) and valid until 1 January 1999 when the 
single currency comes into force.  Naturally, this entails a temporary variation in 
the level of Community support between the various Member States. In view of 
the  operative cvcnts
10  for  the  ACRs for  the  aid  measures  in  question,  several 
ACRs arc  frozen  until  30 June 1999
11
•  In  national  currency,  in  particular'  in 
Swcclen1  this  affects  the  balance  in  aiel  expressed in  ecus  between  the  various 
sectors of agriculture. 
(c) 
10 
II 
12 
The gaps between the frozen ACRs and the RMRs have diminished somewhat for 
the  currencies  which  revalued  in  June  and  July  1995.  One  year  after  those 
revaluations, they stand at 5.0 for the DKR, 3.7 for the 13LF, 2.4 for the HFL and 
1.9 for the DM and the OS. However, the monetary gap for the frozen ACR for 
the SKR has become quite sizeable in the case of aid per hectare: for 1996/97, aid 
in  Sweden will  be  11% higher than the current ACR and  19% higher than the 
common lcycl  defined by  the RMR. Should the SKR remain steady against the 
ecu, the alignment of the  frozen  ACR on the current ACR in July 1999 would 
entail a fall  of around  10% in  aid per hectare expressed in national currency 
12
• 
These large  gaps stem in  particular from  the  fact  that the  freeze  relates to  the 
ACR applicable at the time of the appreciable revaluation and not the threshold 
from which the fall  in the ACR becomes appreciable. This allows any reduction 
in  the  aid  concerned  in  national  currency  to  be  avoided  at  the  time  or' an 
appreciable revaluation. Thus the ACRs for the 13LF, the DKR and especially the 
SKR, which plummeted before appreciating,  were frozen  at a particularly high 
level.  '  · 
Furthermore, in response to the significant devaluations in  the first half of 1995, 
in October 1995 the Council adopted Regulation (EC) No 2611/95 authorizing the 
Member States to grant national aiel  to compensate for the effects on some farm 
incomes of devaluations occurring prior to 31  December 1995 in other Member 
States. The aid in question must be approved by the Commission, be dcgrcssivc 
and be applicable for three years at most. It must not encourage any particular 
1l1c ACR on the date the operative event occurs is  that applied to the amount in  question. 1l1c 
operative event for aid per hectare under the reform of. the CAP occurs on I July. For most other 
aid measures referred to in  Article 7 of Regulation (EEC) No 3813/92, it occurs on  I January. 
Sec Table A 7 of Working Paper on Basic Information. 
On 7 July 1996 there was a further appreciable reduction of 3.280% in the ACR. 
23 type of production having regard to the situation which would have obtained had 
no  devaluation occurred.  France and Belgium notified draft aid schemes under 
Regulation (EC) No 2611/95 before the time limit (30 June 1996). Those draft aid 
·schemes will be described in point 2. 
(d)  With regard to  the conversion rates applicable to  import charges fixed  in  ecus, 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1482/95
13  provides for  the application, as  a 
transitional measure, of a monthly rate where the annual rate provided for in the 
Customs Code
14  should have applied. The Commission subsequently extended the 
application of the transitional monthly rate for a further year, since the Council 
and the Parliament had not yet completed their consideration of  the Commission's 
proposal  to  amend  the  annual  rate  provided  for  in  the  Customs  Code
15  by 
30 June 1996. 
However, the transitional monthly rate is  applicable only to  import charges not 
fixed  by  an  instrument under the CAP within the  meaning of Article 1 of the 
basic agri-monctary Regulation: In other cases, the agricultural conversion rates 
are applied. The usc of  different conversion rates has resulted in certain economic 
inconsistencies and has very greatly complicated administration, with concomitant 
scope  for  errors  and  legal  insecurity.  In  February  1996  the  Commission 
accordingly proposed to amend the agri-monetary arrangements in such a way as 
to eliminate the use of the agricultural conversion rate and  to  usc only one rate 
for import charges on agricultural products
16
•  By 30 June 1996 the Council had 
still not taken a decision on this point. 
(c)  The  concept  of appreciable  revaluation  was  introduced  in  February  1995  by 
Article 9 of  Regulation (EC) No 3813/92 to describe currency appreciations which 
may  have  significant  short-term  consequences,  in  particular  having  regard  to 
international commitments under the GATT agreement and budgetary discipline. 
In origin, the concept was associated with that of an ill!preciable reduction in the 
ACR as defined by Article 1 of Regulation (EEC) No 3813/92. Subsequently, it 
appeared that other reductions in the ACR fell  within the  scope of appreciable 
revaluations, in particular those which could trigger Articles 7 and8 of  Regulation 
(EEC) No 3813/92. In July 1996, Article 8 of  Regulation (EEC) No I 068/93
17 was 
amended so such cases were covered by the definition of  appreciable revaluations. 
2.  Compensatory aid 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
OJ  No  L  145,  29.6.1995,  p.  43.  Amended  by  Regulation  (EC)  No 1224/96  (OJ No L  161, 
29.6.1996, p. 70). 
Article 18 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 (OJ No L 302, 19.10.1992, p.  1). 
COM(95)335 final. 
COM(9G)40 final. 
OJ No L  108,  1.5.1993, p.  106.  Last amended by Regulation (EC) No 1482/96 (OJ No L  188, 
27.7  .1996). 
24 At the end of 1995/96, the six Member States affected by appreciable reductions 
in  their  ACRs  in  June  or  July  1995  had  notified  draft  aid  schemes  under 
Regulation (EC) No  1527/95. The Commission raised no objection to those plans. 
Sweden,  which  has  a  further  six  months  to  notify  aid  under  Regulation  (EC) 
No 2990/95, put forward no plans for schemes during the period under review. 
France and Belgium presented draft national aid schemes before the deadline of 
30 June 1996  to  compensate  for  the  effects  of devaluations  in  other  Member 
States in accordance with Regulation (EEC) No 2611195. The Commission raised 
no objections to such plans. 
The  following  table  summarizes aid  authorized  and  notified.  All  amounts  arc 
expressed  in  millions  of ecus  on  the  basis  of the  RMRs at  1 July 1996.  The 
second and third tranchcs of compensation for  appreciable reductions in ACRs 
amount  respectively  to  two  thirds  and  one  third  of the  first  tranche,  which  is 
shown in the table. 
25 Member State  Appreciable  Ceiling  Notified EU  Notified 
decline in  (ECU million)  financing  national 
ACR (%)  (ECU million)  financing 
(ECU million) 
Regulation (EC) 
No  1527/95 
Belgium  2.193  40.2  20.5  6.1 
Luxembourg  2.193  3.2  1.6  1.6 
Denmark  0.496  8.0 
\  4.0  0.0 
Germany  2.229  216.7  108.3  108.3 
Netherlands  2.572  101.4  50.7  0.0 
Austria  2.264  38.7  19.4  0.0 
Regulation (EC) 
No  2990/95 
Sweden  1.734  20.8  -
Regulation (EC) 
No  2611/95 
Belgium  .  - - 0  3.3 
France  17.3 
(a)  Compensation for appreciable reductions in ACRs (Regulation (EC) No 1527/95) 
Luxembourg  and  Germany  decided  to  grant  the  maximum  possible aid,  using 
national  funds  to  double  the .compensation financed  by  the  EAGGF.  Belgium 
intends providing additional aid equal to  15% of  the maximum authorized, on top 
of the 50% financed  by the EU.  Denmark, the Netherlands and Austria arc  not 
providing additional aid. 
Unlike the other Member States, which allocated aid direct to farmers on the basis 
of past output, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands have opted for  flat-rate 
allocation  for  the  third  tranche,  since  amounts  would  have  been  less  than 
ECU 400 per holding.  . 
In order to avoid overcompensation by sector, consideration was given to ceilings 
on aid per product group. The ceilings were established on the basis of  hypotheses 
for income losses used by the Council when determining the total maximum aid 
authorized.  Accordingly, a  significant•loss of income was anticipated solely  in 
sectors with institutional prices directly affecting prices received by  farmers.  In 
the light of past experience, the major sectors concerned arc cereals, sugar beet, 
26 milk and beef/veal. In view of the Council's decision to grant the aid on an ex-
ante and flat-rate basis, real  losses by  sector in the light of the actual change in 
prices after July  1995  were not taken into  account with a view to  adjusting the 
. ceilings by sector or the total amount of aid. 
In  the  case of Belgium and  Austria,  the  aid  allocated  to  individual  sectors of 
production is not proportional to the ceilings though it falls below the latter in all 
cases. As a result the aid  granted docs not result in overcompensation of losses 
per  sector  in  accordance  with  the  regulations  but  undercompensation  spread 
unevenly  at  sector  level.  No  sector can  be  deemed  overcompensated  for  the 
income loss as estimated by the Council. 
Belgium decided to grant the following amounts in compensation in respect of  the 
1996 tranche. For 1997 and 1998, those amounts will be reduced by one third and 
two thirds respectively. 
Product group  Cereals  Sugar beet  Milk  Beef/veal 
excluding 
maize 
Value of production as  8.15%  10.41%  38.51%  42.93% 
percentage of total (4  product 
groups) 
Maximum aid.for product group  3.33  4.26  15.75  17.56 
(ECU million) 
Total aid authorized  1.53  1.96  7.24  15.84 
(ECU million) 
Aid authorized as percentage of  45.95%  46.01%  45.97%  90.21% 
ceiling 
Aid authorized as percentage of  5.76%  7.38%  27.25%  59.62% 
total (4  product groups) 
Approximate unit aid (ECU)  10.9/ha  37.6/ha  0.43/hl  54.47/LU 
The aid allocation shows that almost the maximum is granted for beef/veal while 
the other product groups receive less. 
The unit  amounts of the three tranches  of the  aid  for  cereals, sugar beet and 
beef/veal arc based on declarations by farmers in connection with compensatory 
payments paid under the reform of the CAP in 1994. In the case of  cereals, there 
is  provision for an adjustment on the basis of the regional yield, while in the 
beef/veal sector, the aid is granted on .the basis of the male bovine animals and 
suckler  cows  on  which  the  premium  was  paid  in  1994.  Quantities· of milk 
27 compensated for relate to deliveries from  l  April  1994 to  31  March  1995 subject 
to a ceiling equal to the quota. Since the amounts granted depend· on production 
prior to 1 July 1995, they arc not deemed to constitute an incentive to  increasing 
production. 
Luxembourg apportioned all aid which may be granted in accordance with the 
following table relating to the 1996 tranche. The following two tranchcs will be 
reduced in accordance with the regulations. The breakdown by product group is 
the same as that for the production concerned. The unit amounts arc allocated to 
farmers  on the  basis of quantities declared under the  system of compensatory 
allowances for less-favoured areas (Regulation (EEC) No 2328/91 ). 
Product group·  Cereals  Sugar beet  Milk  Beef/veal 
Value of production as  11.82%  pm  53.18%  35.00% 
percentage of total (4 product 
groups) 
Maximum aid per product group  376  0  1693  1115 
(ECU '000) 
Total aid authorized  376  0  1693  1115 
(ECU '000) 
Aid authorized as percentage of  100%  100%  100%  100% 
ceiling 
Aid authorized as percentage of  11.81%  - 53.17%  35.01% 
total (4 ·product groups) 
Approximate unit aid (ECU)  13.1/ha  0  34.67/cow  10.92/LU 
Since Denmark could not grant less than ECU 70 perholding, it decided to usc 
the aid for measures in the collective and general interest. EAGGF finance will 
be allocated equally to two funds for measures not entailing production incentives, 
namely PMF (Promille for agriculture) and DAF (project for the development of 
agricultural  products),  which  contribute  towards  measures  involving  research, 
advisory services, training, promotion, etc. In principle these funds are financed 
by compulsory contributions levied on producers. The agri-monctary compensation 
will be allocated to special measures and will therefore lead to new measures or 
a reduction .in con.tributions allocated to  measures under way. 
Germany grants the maximum amount of aid, which is, however, slightly below 
ECU 400  per holding.  Accordingly  Germany  opted  for  a  simplified  form  of 
allocation to farmers, not taking account of income losses per sector. 
28 The aid  entails  a  subsidy  on  farmers'  contributions  to  insurance  against  farm 
accidents. Since 1963, such insurance is subsidized by the State to reduce farmers' 
contributions.  Between  1994  and  1998,  these  subsidies  amounted  to  around 
. ECU 320 million, currently accounting for 35% of the total. The farmers' share, 
which is around ECU 600 million, will be reduced in 1996, 1997 and 1998 by the 
degressive  compensatory  aid,  amounting  to  ECU 216.7 million  in  1996,  and 
ECU 144.5 million and ECU 72.2 million in subsequent years. 
The Netherlands apportion the 1996 tranche of  the aid as set out in the following 
table.  The following  tranche will  be two  thirds of the  first.  The third  tranche, 
amounting  to  around  ECU 225  per holding,  will  be  allocated  in  the  form  of 
measures in the collective and general interest. 
Product group  Cereals  Sugar beet  Potatoes for  Milk  Beef/veal 
starchmaking 
Value of production as  3.75%  6.46%  3.32%  64.13%  22.34% 
percentage of total (5 
product groups) 
Maximum aid per  3.80  6.55  3.37  65.07  22.67 
product group 
(ECU million) 
Total aid authorized  1.90  3.28  1.68  32.54  11.23 
(ECU million)· 
Aid authorized as  50%  50%  50%  50%  50% 
percentage of ceiling 
Aid authorized as  3.75%  6.46%  3.32%  64.13%  22.34% 
percentage of total (5 
product groups) 
Approximate "unit aid  10.56/ha  28..17/ha  27.44/ha  19.08/cow  20.1 0/bovine 
(ECU)  (winter  animal 
wheat)  1-2 years 
The apportionment of  the aid among the sectors concerned follows the breakdown 
in  production.  The  aid  is  granted  to  farmers  on  the  basis  of the  May 1995 
agricultural census data. For cereals and beef/veal, many categories were used to 
split up the aid onthe basis of  the standard gross margin by category, the amount 
granted differing by type of cereals and beef/veal. 
The third tranche will be used for the prevention and monitoring of animal and 
plant diseases where the public interest is  at stake and to compensate for any 
damage due to such diseases or the weather. 
29 As  far  as  compensating for  damage  is  concerned,  the  aid  will  be  used  by  the 
producer organisations to  subsidize insurance premiums or contributions paid to 
that end by farmers. 
Austria  intends  reducing  the  first  tranche  of  aid  m  accordance  with  the 
regulations as set out below. 
Product group  Cereals  Sugar beet  Potatoes for  Milk  Beef/veal 
starchmaking 
Value of production as  15.47%  6.27%  0.45%  44.06%  33.75% 
percentage of total (5 
product group) 
Maximum aid per  5.99  2.43  0.17  17.07  13.08 
product group 
(ECU million) 
Total aid authorized  0  0.94  0.17  10.34  7.91 
(ECU million) 
Aid authorized as  0  38.68%  100.00%  60.57%  60.47% 
percentage of ceiling 
Aid authorized as  0  4.85%  0.88%  53.41%  40.86% 
percentage of total (5 
product groups) 
Approximate unit aid  0  1.08/t  1.77/t  41.66/cow  27.18/head 
(ECU)  (A quota) 
Thus apportioned, the aid provides compensation equal to  100% of  the ceiling for 
potatoes for starchmaking, approximately 60% for milk and bovines, almost 40% 
for sugar beet and zero for cereals. 
The unit amounts for beet and potatoes are based on the quantities covered by 
contracts  between  producers  and  processors  at  1  July  and  31  May  1995 
respectively. For milk and bovines, they are calculated and granted on the basis 
of livestock held at 1 April  1995  and declared under aid schemes to protect the 
environment and maintain the countryside (Regulation (EEC) No 2078/92). 
(b)  . Compensation  for  the  impact  of  devaluations  in  ·other  Member  States 
(Regulation (EC) No 2611/95) 
France and Belgium granted nationally funded aid in single annual instalments to 
offset the effects of the. devaluation of the LIT on the beef industry. 
30 In both cases, the national markets were highly dependent, directly or indirectly, 
on the  Italian market.  In  France, around 50% of exports of live  bovine animals 
and fresh beef/veal, accounting for around 25% of production, is sent to  Italy. In 
-Belgium, 50% of  exports, i.e. around 20% of  production, generally goes to France 
and Italy.  In  the three Member States in question, prices fell  steeply in national 
currency and in ecus from March 1995, coinciding with the beginning of  the sharp 
devaluation  of the  LIT.  To  take  account  of seasonal  changes  in  prices  and 
reductions in  intervention prices, the average weekly prices, minus  I 0%, for the 
last  three  years  were  calculated  by  way  of a  reference.  A  comparison of the 
weekly prices recorded in 1995 with these reference averages shows an additional 
fall  in  prices, significantly between March and  August 1995.  Depending on the 
method applied,  the fall  in  prices attributed  to  the  devaluation of the  LIT was 
3.8% on average, with a maximum of 5%, in France. In Belgium it was  I .7% on 
average, with a maximum of 3%. 
Given the absence of other significant factors and since the period coincided with 
the  devaluation of the  LIT,  these additional  price  falls  were  considered to  be 
consequences of that devaluation. The income loss concerned was thus estimated, 
with a possible fluctuation margin,  at around ECU 17 million in France and ECU 
5.6 million in Belgium. 
In accordance with the above, France calculated the flat-rate aid per category of 
bovine animals and per marketing week, granting the aid to  farmers on the basis 
of animals  sold  during  the  weeks  under  consideration.  In  Belgium  the  aid 
allocated to the Wallonia region amounted to ECU 3.3 million. Given the lack of 
detailed,  reliable  information,  as  far  as  indidivual  operators arc  concerned,  on 
quantities marketed each week during the period in question, ECU I 0.16 per LU 
was allocated on the basis of the premiums paid in  1994 on male bovine animals 
and suckler cows. 
C.  Economic imnact 
Theoretically,  market prices,  which  arc  closely  linked  to  an  intervention  mechanism 
(cereals, sugar, milk and beef/veal), may be affected by the ACRs. Through the prices for 
certain of the prod~cts concerned, the change in ACRs may therefore have repercussions 
on  farmers'  incomes.  Furthermore,  difficulties  may  arise  in  trade  in  the  event  of 
divergence between the ACRs and the RMRs or between market prices and intervention 
prices in national currency. 
However, the prices of other products for which no  intervention mechanism exists to 
provide  market guidance are  not  affected  by  the  ACRs. Nonetheless a  sharp, sudden 
change in the  RMRs may distort trade in such products. This is the case in particular 
where market prices do not follow currency fluctuations. 
Lastly, in addition to the impact of monetary repercussions on prices, farm incomes arc 
directly affected by the ACRs applicable to direct aid to  producers. 
31 1.  Prices 
The analysis relates mainly to  monthly movements during the period  1995/96. 
In the case of products with no intervention mechanism influencing market prices, 
as  may be expected no  link  is  observed between the movements of such prices 
and those of the ACRs. Even in the case of the LIT, which revalued significantly 
from July 1995 to June 1996, the market prices for wine, olive oil, shccpmcat and 
pigmeat rose or varied to an extent out of  all proportion with the reductions in the 
ACRs. 
For other products, the analysis focuses on sectors where usable data arc available 
and covers a single representative market per Member State conccrncd
18
• 
In the absence of  significant devaluations, movements in the ACRs likely to have 
had most repercussions in  1995/96 arc: 
the  continual, significant revaluations of the  LIT (12.1%) and  the  SKR 
(9.9%); 
the  "appreciable" revaluations of the  BLF,  DKR,  OM, 1-IFL  and  OS  m 
June and July 1995 and of the SKR in January  1996. 
(a)  Ccreals
19 
18 
19 
The market prices for common wheat arc substantially higher than the intervention 
prices in national currency. During the 1995/96 marketing year from August 1995 
to  April  1996,  the  market  prices  in  the  three  main  producer  Member  States 
(Germany,  France  and  the  United Kingdom) stood an  average 22% above the 
intervention  price.  As  in  the  previous  year  (when  they  stood  12%  above  the 
intervention price), at this exceptional level market prices arc hardly affected by 
small fluctuations in the intervention price in national currency. 
However, despite the very wide variations in 1995/96, viewed globally the general 
trends in such prices arc not contradictory. Thus market prices (like intervention 
prices, to  which monthly  increases apply)  in most Member States tend to  rise 
during the marketing year. In the case of  the two Member States whose ACRs fell 
significantly in 1995/96 (Italy and Sweden), market prices as well as intervention 
prices almost remained on the same level in terms of national currency, whereas 
the mark~t prices rather fell down in LIT and remained steady in SKR. 
As regards appreciable revaluations covered by compensatory aid, reductions in 
market prices, where they exist, arc difficult to highlight since reductions in the 
Sec Graphs B 2 to B  15  in  Working Paper on Basic lnfomtation. 
See Graph B  I a in  Working Paper on Basic Infommtion. 
32 ACRs for the BLF, DM, HFL and OS occur at the same time as the reduction in 
the intervention prices in ecus at the beginning of the marketing year. Between 
June and July 1995, that reduction was around 15% taking monthly increases into 
·account. 
Between  March-April  and  August-September  1995  (before  and  after  the 
disturbance accompanying changes from one marketing year to the next), national 
prices  fell  in  the  currencies  in  question,  though  prices  in  FF  and  UKL  were 
practically  unchanged  between  the  two  periods  in  question.  However,  where 
reductions in prices are linked with falls in the ACRs, other factors have played 
a part since these falls are not proportional: appreciable reductions in the ACRs 
were around 3%, the smallest being for the DM and the OS, while reductions in 
prices were around 4% to 5% for the BLF and the HFL, 7% to 8% for the DKR 
and the DM, and 11% for the OS. 
Among the factors  affecting these differences  in  price  movements between the 
Member States, the impact of national harvests is clearly decisive.  French output 
in 1995/96 was close to the average for the previous three years and explains the 
firmer prices in FF than in the Member States which revalued, where output rose 
by nearly 10%. The case of the United Kingdom, where prices remained more or 
less stable despite an increase in production, can be explained to some extent by 
the difference in the varieties of wheat covered. 
There were appreciable reductions in the ACRs for the DKR and the SKR in late 
July 1995 and January 1996 respectively. They were accompanied by  significant 
price stability over the period in question and thereafter. At the end of June 1995, 
a  price  reduction,  applied  in  anticipation  and  subsequently  wiped  out  in  the 
turmoil  at the beginning of the marketing year,  was in  theory  possible for  the 
DKR, but not for the SKR, since the latter was revalued much later. 
Lastly, despite some uncertainty and the need for caution due to the many factors 
coming into play but not covered here (such as differences between the various 
types of  cereals), agri-monetary reductions in prices due to revaluations probably 
did not take place given the context ·of high market prices in 1995/96. 
(b)  Milk products
20 
20 
During the first half of  the 1995/96 marketing year, the market price for skimmed-
milk powder (SMP) and butter remained exceptionally high (approximately 10% 
and 5% up) compared withthe intervention prices. 
As the intervention prices in ecus did not change between 1994/95 and 1995/96,' 
variations in the latter in terms of national currency  are due to changes in the 
ACRs, which makes it easier to highlight any effects. 
See Graphs B  I b and B I c in Working Paper on Basic Information. 
33 However,  no  link can be  detected between the  revaluations of the LIT and the 
SKR and movements in  market prices. In  Italy, butter prices soared in  line with 
the  EU  market  despite  the  fall  in  the  ACRs  in  the  latter  half  of  1995; 
. subsequently, they plummeted like everywhere else.  In Sweden, prices for SMP 
and butter remained high, despite large fluctuations, resisting the downward pull 
of the reduction in intervention prices in SKR. 
Market prices in the currencies which underwent an appreciable revaluation in 
June and July 1995 clearly did not follow the downward movement in the ACRs. 
In the absence of an appreciable revaluation, it is very unlikely that prices in the 
currencies in question would have increased or, if so, have risen further. Changes 
in the latter generally follow trends over several months, which differ only slightly 
from  those recorded  in  FF  and  UKL,  the  ACRs for  which did  not fall  at  the 
beginning 'of the marketing year. 
(c)  Beef/veaF
1 
21 
Prices for meat of'young bovine animals fell  sharply in early 1995, approaching 
or even attaining the conditions which trigger intervention. Subsequently, in late 
1995  and until the bovine spongiform encephalopathy crisis broke, prices were 
much firmer. 
In some Member States, the  fall  in  prices  between  March and  July  1995  was 
probably partly influenced by  prices in LIT, which did not rise in pace with the 
ACRs. Such relatively low prices affected the  French market, which is heavily 
dependent on trade with Italy, and subsequently other Member States. 
After July 1995, the low prices in LIT remained stable; since they had not risen 
beforehand, they did not follow the downward slide in the ACRs. Market prices 
in  SKR,  another currency  which  appreciated  significantly  during  the  1995/96 
marketing year, followed the downward movement in the ACRs fairly closely. 
In the case of the currencies which underwent an appreciable revaluation at the 
beginning of  the marketing year, the downward movement of market prices seems 
to be linked with that of the ACRs. Thus despite a smaller fall in June and July 
1995 than that recorded for the FF (which was relatively strongly affected by the 
Italian market), the price recovery of the second half of 1995 was not as firm in 
the Member States which revalued as it was in France and the United Kingdom. 
Furthetmore, the change in market prices in BLF, DKR, DM, HFL and OS tended 
.  to follow on the heels of  the movement in intervention prices in national currency 
between the beginning of 1995 and the beginning of the 1995/96 marketing year. 
See Graph B  1 d of Working Paper on Basi'c Information. 
34 2.  Trade 
. Monthly variations from  1992 to  1995  in exports with the other Member States 
and  non-member  countries arc  analysed.  On  average,  the  period  is  marked  in 
particular by the devaluations in the LIT, the PTA and the DRA. 
(a)  In  the short term,  in almost all  cases the scale of the  monthly  variations in the 
value of exports masks the effects of any currency variations
22
• 
22 
23 
In the case of certain substantial devaluations like that in the LIT in spring 1995 
or the UKL  in late  1992, the  months concerned show a brief surge in exports. 
Nonetheless, the sharp devaluations in the LIT in  late  1992 and in the  PTA in 
early summer 1993 were not accompanied by any rise in exports. Furthermore, the 
very substantial rises in exports of  products like sugar and milk products in Spain 
in 1994 and 1995 clearly have no link with currency movements. Conversely, the 
appreciation of the LIT at the end of 1995  had no  significant impact on general 
trends in Italian exports of the various agricultural product groups. 
Statistics of Member States' trade with those whose currencies devalued sharply 
did not indicate significant links between the total exports of any product group 
and short-term currency movements. 
Among other possible short-term agri-monetary effects, deflection of trade may 
in. theory  occur  for  products  attracting  export  refunds  when  the  aggregate 
monetary gap widens
23
• The scale of  such aggregate gaps depends in particular on 
transport  costs  from  one  Member  State  to  another,  and  therefore  on  their 
geographical remoteness and the type of products concerned. 
In this respect, the main risks incurred in  1995/96 were due to  positive gaps for 
the LIT and SKR, which exceeded five  points during the  confirmation periods. 
For the LIT, aggregate gaps inexcess of five points arose with the DRA, DM and 
OS and recurred often in excess of four points with the DRA and OS. Aggregate 
gaps  for  the  SKR,  which  exceeded  six  points  against  the  IRL,  UKL  and  in 
particular FMK, or five points with the DM and HFL, and up to four points with 
the DKR, afforded opportunities for deflection of trade flows.  Such risks were 
high prior to January 1996 when large aggregate gaps persisted. 
Nevertheless, export statistics show no movement which. can be put down to such 
agri-monetary gaps. Any cases of deflection of trade due to differences between 
See Graphs C3  to CI of Working Paper on Dasic Information. 
See Graph A 6 of Working Paper on Dasic Information. 
35 export  refunds  in  national  currency  occur  only  sporadically.  Even where  the 
aggregate  gaps over two  months arc  significant; as  was  the  case at the end of 
1995,  no  systematically organized network is  set up  on account of uncertainty 
·about  the  time  the  situation  will  last.  Naturally,  this  docs  not  rule  out  the 
possibility that isolated cases of financial  significance to  the individual operator 
may arise. 
(b)  Over longer periods, an analysis of the  impact of currency  fluctuations on the 
single  market
24  shows that,  generally  speaking,  exports  can  be  influenced  by 
competition. However, that impact vies with internal demand, exporters' attitude 
vis-a-vis their profit margins and structural causes affecting some product groups 
more than others.  The interplay of these factors  is  such that distinguishing the 
effects of any particular one is very tricky. 
24 
25 
Competitiveness can be gauged by the actual exchange rate, which takes account 
of the currency developments in each Member State, depending on the relative 
importance  of its  economic  partners,  and  the  movement  of production  costs. 
According  to  that  indicator,  from  1992  to  1995  the  trend  in  Member States' 
competitiveness was: 
fairly negative in Germany, Belgium, Greece and the Netherlands; 
moderately  negative  in  France,  Denmark  and  Portugal  and  moderately 
positive in Ireland; 
fairly positive in Spain and the United Kingdom and very positive in Italy. 
Other indicators of competitiveness provide approximately the same grading for 
the period in question. 
A  statistical  examination
25  shows  an  overall  link  between  an  increase  in 
competitiveness and a rise .in value in national currency. That overall link is still 
apparent  when  exports  are  expressed  in  national  currency  deflated  using  the 
consumer price index. 
However, it is not apparent when exports are considered in terms of  value in ecus 
or in quantity in tonnes. 
Report of the  Directorate-General  for Economic  and  Financial  Affairs  published  in  "European 
Economy",  Reports and Studies No 4-1995. 
See Tables and Graphs Cl and C2 of Working Paper on Basic Information. 
36 In general, the development of competitiveness was therefore followed by that of 
profits  on  exports  but  not  by  shifts  in  market  shares.  Thus  while  quantities 
exported increased overall by around 5% per year in both Italy and Germany, unit 
·prices rose in the former case and fell in the latter in terms of  constant purchasing 
power. 
The main characteristics highlighted by the overall analysis arc found in the group 
of  products not affected by major intervention mechanisms. They remain present, 
to  a  lesser  degree,  in  the  case  of other  products  (cereals,  sugar,  milk  and 
beef/veal).  The  impact  of currency  movements  on  these  products  subject  to 
intervention should not have occurred where the differences in  price in national 
currency had simply reflected the agri-monetary gaps. Some explanation for their 
existence lies in the disparities outlined in point C.l between the movements in 
market prices and in intervention prices in national currency. The disparities are 
even larger than those described (e.g.  in the case of common wheat) where the 
products in question arc derived from others directly affected by intervention. A 
more refined and  highly specific analysis by  product group provides different, 
confused results, which arc strongly affected by factors peculiar to the markets in 
question. 
Compared with the general trend, the situation in certain Member States is highly 
specific. Thus the improvement in competitiveness in  Spain is  only half that in 
Italy, while the rise in Spain's exports is almost as  great in  terms of value and 
much  greater  in  terms  of quantity.  Accordingly,  results  for  Spain  essentially 
reflect the consequences of the reorganization of production and marketing in the 
sugar and dairy industries within the European Union. 
Other examples of  note are Belgium, whose performance outstripped expectations 
having regard to the index of competitiveness adopted, in particular in fruit and 
vegetables, and the United Kingdom, whose performance was poor, mainly owing 
to the decline in quantities of cereals exported. 
3.  Incomes 
The latest statistics of farm incomes relate to  1995.  In detail, the effects of the 
agri-monetary arrangements on incomes in 1995 are very difficult to gauge since 
they depend in particular on the actual impact of  the agricultural conversion rates 
on market prices, on the operative events for ACRs, and on the terms of  payment 
for purchases, sales and aid to farmers. As a result some effects visible in 1995 
arc due  to.  movements in ACRs in  1994,  whereas the  consequences of certain 
changes in the ACRs·for 1995 will only be felt in 1996 or even later. 
To assess the  effects of the ACRs in  the  period  1995/96  on income over  12 
months, certain approximations and assumptions were nonetheless needed: 
prices received by farmers in 1995/96 are deemed to be the same as those 
recorded in 1995 and to mirror the change in the ACRs for producers of 
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sugar beet and  beef/veal.  In  other production sectors, the  impact of the 
ACRs is considered nil, in accordance with results set out in point C. I and 
the relatively negligible overall income affected by  the minimum prices 
(potato starch, processed fruit and vegetables, etc.); 
agri-monetary compensatory aid notified or provided for by the Member 
States is assumed to have been paid in I995/96 in order to balance out the 
effects of  appreciable revaluations on prices. In the case of Sweden, where 
an  appreciable  revaluation  occurred  in  January  1996,  only  half  the 
maximum aid payable was taken into account; 
amounts of direct aid to producers, expressed per hectare cultivated, and 
aid per tonne of seed produced are those for the  1995/96 marketing year, 
to which the ACR for  I July 1955 is applied
26
; 
the  ACR for  1 January  I996 is  applied to  the  I995  sheep premium; to 
group the whole  impact of the  ACR for  I  January  1996 on incomes in 
1995, the balance ofthe 1994 premiums, which was actually paid in 1995, 
is  replaced by the balance of the  1995  premiums, which is actually paid 
in  1996; 
the  ACRs for  early  1995,  or even early  1994  in  the  case of olive  oil, 
actually apply to beef premiums, structural aid, the tobacco premium and 
aid to olive-oil producers, which is paid in 1995. In order to assess the full 
impact on  12  months of the ACRs for  1995/96, it has been assumed that 
those  premiums  and  aid  are  determined  by  the  ACRs  valid  at  the 
beginning· of 1996.  Aid to  major olive-oil producers is  deemed to  have 
been  affected  by  the  average  ACRs from  November  1995  to  February 
1996 and the other amounts by the ACR for  1 January 1996. 
Using this theoretical model, which groups the full  impact of the 1995/96 ACRs 
over 12 months, the following were assessed: 
the  effect of the  annual  movement of the  ACRs between  1994/95  and 
1995/96,  by  multiplying  the  income  components  affected  by  the  agri-
monctary arrangements by the gap between the ACRs applied during those 
two periods; 
the  annual  effect  of the  agri-monetary  arrangements  in  1995/96,  by 
multiplying those components by the gap between the ACRs applied and 
the corresponding RMRs. 
·- For the sake of  simplification, the small number of  cases where the operative event takes place on 
1 August have been dealt with in the same way as the majority of  cases where the operative event 
for the ACR takes place on  1 July. 
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Despite  its  abstract nature,  this  model  docs  reveal  a  significant impact  of the 
ACRs on incomes and variation in that impact depending on the Member States
27
• 
· The effect of the movement in  ACRs compared with the preceding year turns out 
to  be fairly small, generally below 2% in most Member States, and is: 
fairly  positive  in  Luxembourg,  Germany,  Greece,  Finland,  Ireland  and 
Spain, 
fairly negative in Belgium and Denmark, 
fairly neutral in Portugal, France, the Netherlands and Austria. 
These slight differences in movement arc mainly the result of a balance, or lack 
thereof,  between  the  effects  of  the  ACRs  on  prices  and  the  effects  of 
compensatory aid in the Member States concerned; they arc due to  the effects of 
devaluations on aid in the case of Greece, Ireland and Spain. 
The impact of the year-on-year change is  particularly positive in  three Member 
States, namely: 
Sweden (+ 7.2%), owing to the increase in aid per hectare, 
Italy and the United Kingdom (+ 4.1% and + 4.5% respectively), owing 
to increases in prices and aid,  the  latter accounting for two thirds of the 
effect in  Italy and half in the United Kingdom. 
The overall impact on net income from farming is  1.7% or ECU I  559  million. 
Of that  amount,  71%  can  be  put  down  to  the  impact  on  aid  while  of the 
remainder, 21% ofthe total is due to compensatory aid and only 8% to the impact 
on pnces. 
The annual  impact of the agri-monctary arrangements,  by  comparison with the 
situation that would have obtained had the RMR been applied directly in place of 
the ACR in 1995/96, is beneficial for all  the Member States. 
\ 
The major benefit in terms of incomes occurred in Sweden(+ 8.8%). 
· The  other  Member States  where  incomes  rose  substantially  are  Luxembourg 
(+ 5.6%), Germany  (+ 4.6%),  Belgium and Denmark (+  3.8%).  The rise  was 
smaller in Austria (+ 2.5%) as the large proportion of income accounted for by 
national aid is not affected. 
Farmers in the Netherlands, Ireland, Italy and Spain saw their incomes rise by 
around 2%. The other Member States saw smaller rises of  around 1% or even less 
in the case of Greece and Portugal. 
See Tables D 1,  D 2 and D 3 of Working Paper on Basic Information. 
39 In total, the effect on net income from farming is 1.9% or ECU 1 718 million, the 
proportion due to  aid being lower in  this case, at only 45%.  Compensatory aid 
accounts for  19% and prices for 36% of the total impact on income  .. 
D.  Financial impact 
1.  Methodological aspects 
(a)  Classification of agri-monetary effects 
28 
In the agri-monetary area, the legacy of  the switch-over (or green ecu) mechanism 
weighs heavy on the Community budget. Introduced in 1984, the mechanism was 
discontinued from  1 February  1995.  It resulted in a general  increase of around 
20% in prices and amounts expressed in ecus, which  can~elled out the effects of 
bringing  the  conversion  rates  used  in  agriculture  back  to  a  realistic  level. 
Previously, from 1990 to 1993 it also brought about a fall totalling 1.46% in most 
prices and amounts under the CAP. 
It would be wrong to  ascribe the costs in question to  the green ccu mechanism 
itself. It is unlikely that, had it not existed, prices and amounts in ecus would have 
developed as they did. However, in one way or another, those costs represent the 
financial legacy of  the agri-monetary problems existing before the abolition of  the 
green ccu. 
This  legacy  of  past  costs  docs  not  stem  from  the  present  agri-monctary 
mechanisms but rather  from  the  final  value of the  switch-over coefficient,  I.e. 
1.207509, and the structure of annual expenditure in ccus. 
Firstly, they include the effects of the general rise in prices and amounts in ecus 
in  early  February  1995.  Those  effects  can  be  determined  on the  b~si~ of the 
difference between total EAGGF Guarantee Section expenditure minus the agri-
monetary effects relating to the events of 1995/96 .and the same total so reduced, 
divided by  1.207509. 
Calculated as above, the financial impact of this rise in prices has to be corrected 
as  far  as  the expenses connected to  the  world market price are concerned,  i.e. 
certain export refunds and certain aids
28
• For the amounts concerned, the method 
indicated in the above paragraphc affects the difference between the level of the 
prices of the European Union and the world market level, whereas only common 
prices arc modified. 
Moreover, the agri-monetary reduction in prices in ccus was 0.17%  in  1990, or 
11% of  the total fall, but was applied to more than 90% of  the EAGGF Guarantee 
These effects arc illustrated in  Table E  I of the Working Paper on  Basic lnfonnation 
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Section.  The  1993  reduction  amounted  to  1.29%  but  it  was  not  applied  to 
compensatory payments under the reform. On average, an agri-monctary reduction 
of 1% in  prices results in a 0.7% reduction in  EAGGF expenditure
29
• 
Furthermore,  the financial  impact of developments  in  1995/96 stem from  four 
mechanisms or measures,  namely  thresholds, operative  events,  the  freezing  of 
ACRs and compensatory aid. 
The cost of agri-monetary compensatory aid is identified in the  1996 budget and 
the 1997 preliminary draft budget. The fact that these costs arc degrcssive is laid 
down in the regulations and the granting of the  last tranches of aid decided in 
1995/96 should affect the budget for .1998  and,  to  a very  slight extent, that for 
1999. 
The  freezing  of ACRs  results  in  a  cost  equal,  in  national  currency,  to  the 
difference between the frozen ACR and that known on the date of the operative 
event concerned, multiplied by the amount in ecus of the aid to  which it applies. 
As the ACRs arc frozen until  I January 1999, this will affect the  1999 budget as 
regards all the aid measures concerned and that for the year 2000 as regards beef 
premiums only. 
The  financial  effects  of the  thresholds  and  operative  events  stem· from  the 
difference between: 
and 
the agricultural conversion rate on the date of the operative event for the 
amount concerned, 
the  rate  applicable  for  the  booking  of expenditure  in  ecus  (accounting 
rate), i.e. the rate for the  1Oth day of the month of entry in the accounts 
of the  expenditure  in  national  currency;  this  is  generally  the.. month 
following that of payment to  the recipient by  the Member State. 
The  effect of the  thresholds  is  due  _to  the  difference  between  the  agricultural 
conversion rate and the accounting rate on the date of the operative event.  The 
effect of  the operative events relates to the difference between the accounting rate 
on the date of the operative event and the same rate on the date of the booking 
. of the  expenditure  in  ecus.  Irrespective  of the  system  of ACR selected  (and 
therefore of no  usc in comparing such systems), this  effect was omitted in  the 
previous agri-monetary report relating to  1993  and  1994. 
Tite  percentage 0.7% comes  from  annual  Commission  reports  in  1994,  1995  and  1996 on the 
impact on EAGGF Guarantee Section expenditure of: 
- movements in the dollar/ccu parity, 
- rises in  the correcting factor as  a result of monetary realignment within the EMS. 
41 (b)  Method for estimating the costs of developments in  1995/96 
30 
31 
Agri-monctary events and decisions in 1995/96 mainly affect the budgets for 1996 
to  1999. 
When estimating the agri-monctary effects on the 1996 budget, account was taken 
of the preliminary draft supplementary and amending budget for  1996 (PDSAB 
96) as at 30 June 1996, drawn up on the basis of conversion rates available on 6 
May 1996. 
For the effects from 1997 to  1999, calculations are based on the  1997 preliminary 
draft budget (PDB 97) as at  30 June 1996, drawn up  using the  conversion rates 
available on 21  March ·1996. 
··  The bases (PDSAB 96 and PDB 97) were corrected by replacing the ACRs used 
to  draw them up  by the ACRs available on  I  July  1996
30
•  The accounting rate 
used  was  not  adjusted as  it  is  of minor significance  among  the  agri-monetary 
effects due to  variations in the ACRs. 
The  PDSAI3  96  and  PDB  97  as  corrected  on  I  July  1996  show  the 
situation as provided by the latest ACRs available at the end of 1995/96. 
Expenditure is  broken down on the one hand on the basis of tA.c  various 
operative events for the ACRs affecting them and on the other hand on the 
basis of past expenditure between the various currencies of the  Member 
States. 
An estimate of  Community expenditure irrespective of any agri-monetary 
arrangements is arrived at by replacing the ACRs used in the PDSAI3 96 
and the PDI3  97 by the RMRs applying at the beginning of the month of 
booking of such expenditure and deducting agri-monetary corppcnsation 
paid. 
Note  that  the  estimate  for  Jhc  month  of  booking  of  each  type  of 
expenditure is a fairly shal)' approximation, subject to a wide variations
31
• 
The RMRs for  I July  1996 arc used for all dates of entry in the accounts 
thereafter.  · 
The overall  effect of freezing  the  ACRs is  calculated  by  replacing  the 
ACRs actually  used  for  the  aid  in  question  in  the  PDSAB  96 and  the 
PDI3  97 by the current ACRs applying on the date of the operative events 
for such aid. 
Sec Tables E 3 to E G of the Working Paper on Basic Information. 
See Table E 3 of Working Paper on Basic Information. 
42 The effect of the operative events is assessed on the basis of  the difference 
between the results of the calculation outlined in the second indent and the 
outcome of a similar simulation using the RMRs applying Qn  the date of 
the  operative events for  the  ACRs actually applied.  Given  reservations 
regarding the  identification of the  month of entry  in  the  accounts, that 
assessment is rather imprecise and it becomes impossible after 1997 as all 
the conversion rates applicable after  1 July  1996  arc  replaced  by  those 
available and applicable on  I July  I996. 
The  impact  of the  margins  is  gauged  on  the  basis  of the  difference 
between the results of the situation with the current (non-frozen) ACRs as 
described in the third indent, and the outcome of the simulation using the 
RMRs valid on the date of the operative events, as outlined in the fourth 
indent. 
The  ACRs  for  1995/96  affect  75%  of expenditure  in  the  PDSAB  96.  The 
conversion  rates  valid  on  I  July  1996  arc  applied  to  3% of the  expenditure 
actually  stemming  from  an  operative  event  on  that  date  but  also  to  the  10% 
covered by operative events occurring subsequently, from 2 July to  15  October 
1996. The conversion rates valid on the dates of operative events prior to  1 July 
1995, but not prior to November 1994, arc applied to almost all other expenditure 
in  the  1996  budget.  Overall,  barely  I%  of the  expenditure  is  deemed  to  be 
unaffected by the ACRs. 
Only 2% of expenditure in the PDB 97  is  affected by  the ACRs with operative 
events occurring  prior to  the  period  under  review.  1 I% of the  expenditure  is 
affected  by  the  ACRs  for  early  I 996  and  37%  by  those  for  I  July  1996. 
Accordingly, almost 50% of  the PDB 97 hinges on the conversion rate  applicable 
from 2 July I 996 to 15 October 1997. Those rates, which were not available when 
this report was drafted, arc replaced by  the conversion rates for  1 Ju!y 1996. 
As regards figures in the 1998 and  I 999 budgets carried over from the PDB 97, 
almost all the relevant operative events will take place after I July  1996 and the 
ACRs arc replaced by those for  I July 1996. 
Overall,  the  agri-monetary  situation at  I  July  1996  is  of great  importance  in 
estimates for  1997,  1998  and  1999.  Highly  short-term in  scope,  this  situation 
shows a  very large monetary gap for the  SKR (+ 6.779), which,  in accordance 
with the agri-monetary rules, cannot be maintained for long. The LIT (+ 4.986) 
and the IRL (+ 4.603) also have large monetary gaps, while the gaps for the OM, 
the HFL and the OS arc close to zero. 
The  gaps  will  no  doubt  evolve,  which  will  have  a  big  effect  on  the.  results 
calculated  here.  However,  it  should  be  noted  that  the  average  weighted  gap 
according to  the breakdown by currency in the  1996  budget is  2.2% at  I  July 
1996 while the average for 1995/96 is 2.1 %. 
43 2.  Results of estimates 
(a)  The legacy of the past 
In the light of estimates for costs relating to developments in  1995/96 (sec point 
(b)  below),  the  effects of the  green  ccu  mechanism  highlighted  by  the  rise  in 
prices in ccus entail expenditure of ECU 6 800 million for the  1996 budget and 
ECU 6 920 million for  1997. 
The effects of the green ccu, passed on through world market prices, arc estimated 
to result in an extra cost of ECU 1 320 million per year32• 
Agri-monctary .reductions  in  prices,  which  amount  to  1.46%  in  total,  result in 
savings of around ECU 340 million per year. 
Altogether, the residual effects of past agri-monetary problems involve a cost of 
around ECU 7 800 to  7 900 million each year. 
(b)  Developments in  1995/96 
32 
The results set out in the table below show an annual cost of around ECU 1 200 
to  1 300 million per year. 
Around two thirds of that cost is due to  the effects of the margins. However, the 
cost of the margins depends on future currency movement, in  entirety as regards 
1998 and  1999 and half thereof in 1997. 
The reason margins entail a cost is basically attributable to  the asymmetry of the 
mechanisms, whereby positive monetary gaps can rise to  5 points while negative 
gaps  arc  usually  limited  by  a  variable  threshold determined  by  the_ maximum 
positive gap  minus  5  points.  Moreover,  in  situations of steady and  significant 
appreciation for  several currencies, as  in  1995/96, the duration of confirmation 
periods plays an important role in keeping the largest positive gaps in existence 
over time. 
The cost of operative events,  which  is  difficult to  compress without distorting 
markets,  is  around  ECU  100  million  per  year.  This  result  is  unusually  high 
because there was no  offsetting in  1995/96 between currencies that appreciated 
and those that depreciated. It cannot be estimated at present for  1998 or 1999. 
The cost  due  to  freezing  ACRs gradually  rises,  because  of operative  events, 
eventually reaching ECU 185 million. As the freeze will continue until·l January 
1999, it also affects the budget for the year 2000. 
Sec Table E 2 of Working Paper on I3asic  Infonnation. 
44 The cost of compensatory aids could be  reduced as  from  1997 in  order to  take 
into  account the  devaluation occurred  after the  appreciable  revaluations which 
justified these aids.  The incidence of these devaluations  on the  amount of the 
tranches of the aids which have not yet been granted has to  be examined by the 
Commission following the management committee procedure. 
(ECU million) 
Costs of agri-monetary events in 1995/96  1996  1997  1998  1999 
A - Mechanisms actually anplied 
ACR freeze  Ill  180  185  185 
Compensatory aid  201  141  70  2 
Permitted margins  817  890  916  913 
Operative events  107  104  - -
TOTAL  1 236  1 315  1 171  1 100 
B - Hypothetical ap_nlication  of Articles 7 and 8 of Regulation (EEC) No 3.813/92 
Increase in aid (Article 7)  653  2 812  2 932  2 932 
Compensatory aid (Article 8)  0  201  138  70 
Permitted margins  823  953  983  979 
Operative events  117  104  - -
TOTAL  1 593  4 070  4 053  3 981 
As  compared  with  the  allocations  per  Member  State  in  the  PDSAB  96,  the  main 
beneficiary under the agri-monetary arrangements is Sweden with an increase of 11.2% 
in expenditure in SKR. This is the result of the effects of the margins and the operative 
events  in a  climate of high currency appreciation.  In the  future,  even if those effects 
disappear, Sweden will continue to be a major beneficiary under the arrangements thanks 
to  the freeze on the ACRs, the effects of which will be felt  from  1997. 
The second beneficiary under the arrangements in  1996 is  Italy with a 5.6% increase in 
the Community expenditure concerned. This result, which is linked with the appreciation 
of the LIT during the period under review, could be called into question in the future. 
Thereafter, with increases of 4.7% to 3.8% in the Community expenditure involved arc 
the  Member States with ACRs frozen  in June and  July  1995.  The currency  shuation 
affecting those Member States has tempered the  impact of the margins but this could 
change in the future. 
45 The impact of the Council Decisions of June 1995, i.e.  the freeze on ACRs and the flat-
rate compensatory aid introduced in place of Articles 7 and 8 of Regulation (EEC) No 
3813/92, can be assessed by estimating the cost that would have been incurred under the 
agri-monetary arrangements had those Decisions not been adopted.  Savings turn out to 
be close to ECU 360 million in  1996, ECU 2 750 million in 1997 and almost ECU 8 900 
million over four years. 
The enormous cost of Articles 7  and 8 of Regulation (EEC) No  3813/92 seems to be 
mainly due to the level of per hectare aid in SKR (which would have been  10% higher 
in ecus if maintained  in SKR). Supposing Article 7 to  have  been applied  only  to  the 
appreciable revaluations of  June and July 1995, costs would have been the same in  1996 
as they actually were, but nearly ECU 700 million higher in 1997 and almost ECU 2 500 
million higher over four years (1996 to  1999). 
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